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USIB-D-15.2/92
Final
USIB-Approved
9 April 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD


SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63, "Bloc Economic
and Military Assistance Programs"

REFERENCE : USIB-D-15.2/92, 15 January 1963

1. USIB, on 8 April 1963, approved the subject Post-Mortem
as circulated in the reference.

USIB Action Requested:

2. In accordance with Part II of that Post-Mortem (copy attached)
USIB members are requested to take such action as they deem appropriate
to remedy the deficiencies noted therein. 25X1



Executive Secretary

Attachment

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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Attachment
USIB-D-15.2/92
Final
USIB-Approved
9 April 1963

Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63

Bloc Economic and Military Assistance Programs

I. Findings

During the preparation of this estimate there appeared a number of areas in which more information would have been useful.

We have little precise information concerning how the Soviets now view the short term and the longer term goals and objectives of their aid programs. More information would be useful on the respects in which the Bloc countries consider the aid programs successful and the degree to which there is internal opposition to the aid programs.

More information would be useful on the impact of the programs in the recipient countries, including effects on the fortunes of local Communist parties.

More information is needed on military contracts, deliveries, and payment terms. With respect to both military and economic aid, there is a need for more precise information concerning drawings on credits, repayment, and numbers of bloc technicians in recipient countries.

More information would be useful on programs for training students from underdeveloped areas in Bloc countries.

II. Action

USIB members are requested to take such action as they deem appropriate to remedy these deficiencies.

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USIB-D-15.2/92
15 January 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63

REFERENCE : USIB-M-251, 9 January 1963, item 6.b.

1. On 10 January 1963, USIB, through procedure indicated in the referenced minute, approved NIE 10-63, "Bloc Economic and Military Assistance Programs". Inasmuch, however, as the Intelligence Board did not at that time act specifically on the Post-Mortem to that paper, such action is requested below.

USIB Action Requested:

2. USIB members are requested to consider the attached Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63, as developed by the Board of National Estimates and the USIB representatives, and advise the Secretariat by close of business 21 January of either their concurrence in or other views on that document.



25X1

Executive Secretary

Attachment

Record of action attached. Also see USIB-D-15.2/92, Final

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Attachment
USIB-D-15.2/92
15 January 1963

Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63

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Revised Draft of 8 January 1963,

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Attachment
USIB-D-15.2/92
15 January 1963

II. Action

USIB members are requested to take such action as they deem appropriate to remedy these deficiencies.

Revised Draft of 8 January 1963

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Ex. Dir. / CIA	7 Apr	
2	EA/DCI	8 April	
3	Chairman, USIB	1963	
4	ExSec/USIB		
5			
6			
4	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
3	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	1&2 INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 40px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. Acting ExSec/USIB </div> <div> DATE 2 Apr 63 </div> </div>			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/I	Ch	
2	Ex. Dir. /CIA	21 Jan	
3	DDCI 1/22/63 1320		
4	EA/DCI		
5	Chairman, USIB		
6	Ex. Sec. /USIB		
6	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
5	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
1 & 3	CONCURRENCE	2 & 4 INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: Concur in, and recommend that Chairman, USIB, approve the attached Post-Mortem to NIE 10-63:			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div> Ray S. Cline Deputy Director (Intelligence)		21 Jan 63 Date	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div> Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director of Central Intelligence		21 Jan 63 Date	
Approve, subject to concurrence of other USIB members:			
John A. McCone Chairman, USIB		Date	
TO HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. Ex. Sec. /USIB		DATE 18 Jan 63	
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

2 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, USIB

SUBJECT : USIB Action on Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63,
"Bloc Economic and Military Assistance Programs"

REFERENCE : USIB-D-15.2/92, 15 January 1963 (copy attached)

1. A request for action by the Chairman, USIB, is contained in paragraph 4 below.

2. As of 1 April 1963, all other Intelligence Board members had advised the Secretariat of their concurrence in the Post-Mortem on NIE which was submitted in the reference for USIB telephone action. The FBI abstained from action on this matter.


3. Initially, as indicated in Tab A, the State Department raised some objection to this Post-Mortem but on 1 April, with reference to Mr. Kent's comments regarding the objection in Tab B, State withdrew from its position and concurred in the Post-Mortem as written.

4. Approval of the Chairman, USIB, is required and requested hereby to complete Board action on the subject paper.

Attachments

Acting Executive Secretary

Approve the Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63,
as submitted in USIB-D-15.2/92:


John A. McCone
Chairman, USIB

8 April 1963
Date

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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22 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Thomas Hughes, Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State


SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63

REFERENCE : Roger Hilsman's Memorandum of
1 February 1963

1. I have always understood that a post-mortem on an NIE was to be a statement by those who participated in the preparation of the estimate on the adequacy of the intelligence available. It would point out those areas, general or specific, where there were significant gaps whose filling would have permitted a better estimate. I have not considered that it should serve as a list of requirements for collection or an indication of priorities. While it would be futile to mention matters on which intelligence clearly could not be obtained, it has not seemed to me that inclusion of an item indicated the likelihood that the gap could be filled. Inclusion simply puts us on record as being aware that the gap exists. Other established channels exist for the levying of detailed requirements and the establishment of priorities for collection. The last sentence in the post-mortem states that it is left to the individual USIB members to determine what action is appropriate to remedy the deficiencies.

2. I believe that the post-mortem draft, which was approved by all the representatives during coordination and which has been concurred in by all members of USIB except the Department of State, accurately reflects the main intelligence gaps which were encountered in the preparation of NIE 10-63. It does not seem to me to include matters on which it is clearly impossible to obtain intelligence.

TAB B



3. With respect to the first substantive paragraph of the Post-Mortem (Soviet goals, objectives and evaluation), I believe both sentences should be taken together. Any information as to how the Soviets view the results of their programs would throw light on their present objectives and the likelihood and scope of new programs. It seems to me not unreasonable to believe that information along these lines could be obtained, including indications of whether there is internal Soviet opposition at a time when there are strains in certain sectors of the Soviet economy.

4. As to the impact of programs, we have extensive contacts in recipient countries, both in official and unofficial circles, and reactions of such people to Bloc aid programs should not be difficult to obtain. We should also be able to obtain some information on the effects of the aid programs on the positions or fortunes of local Communist parties at least to the extent of ascertaining whether the position of local communists is enhanced as a result of Bloc programs.

5. Our economists inform us that, though we have considerable information on certain aid programs, we still have a continuing need for details on many contracts and deliveries e.g. prices, quality data, delivery times etc. Our information is, of course, better on certain countries than on others. In the sphere of military aid, both the Bloc and the recipient countries attempt to keep most aspects of these programs secret. Such information as we have on the details on military contracts has been obtained by clandestine means, and there are still large areas in which we have little or no precise information.

/S/ Sherman Kent
Assistant Director
National Estimates

C
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February 1, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Sherman Kent, Chairman,
Board of National Estimates,
Central Intelligence Agency.

SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63

Since we participated in the preparation of this Post-Mortem we have had some second thoughts, which I set forth for you here.

I appreciate the need for exact information on the broad subject of the Soviet economic effort, but I wonder whether the Post-Mortem fully balances this need against the danger of suggesting to readers that the information of this quality can be got. After all, we certainly would be correct in saying that we need the most accurate and detailed information on Russian war plans, but we should be most incorrect in suggesting that there is some systematic way in which we can obtain it.

In this sense the idea that we shall have "precise" information concerning the Soviet view of the goals and objectives of their aid program will whet appetites which I believe there is no way to satisfy with information at a degree of specificity which would amount to precision. Judgments on these subjective matters can be formed only by extrapolating evidence which is itself circumstantial and indirect -- indeed, it is these very judgments which the NIE process is designed to produce. In short, the answers to these questions will be estimative judgments based upon observation of what the Russians actually are doing, failing to do, or ceasing to do; the answers will too seldom be found in specific information or data that exactly apply to the questions.

I don't suppose the Post-Mortem will reach many unprofessional hands, but it seems to me a pity to run the danger of misleading any reader. And even professionals might benefit from a more meaningful statement of what it is we think can be collected--which is not information about views, but information about actions which can be interpreted to reflect views.

TAB A

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Much the same can be said about the second item. Indeed, since we are so unsure about the impact of our own aid programs, why should we expect solid information about the impact of other people's programs? Again it seems to me that the points made here are estimative points, not collection points. We should indeed be interested in evidence that the programs were aimed in specific ways at affecting local parties -- for instance, through the transfer of funds, or the obtaining of government jobs for party members, or to meet needs expressed by the parties themselves. But when it comes to the "fortune of the party" we will always have to rely on overall estimative judgment. I should fear that to register our requirement on this level of estimative generality might obscure the point that we want detail on communications and transactions between Bloc officials and local party personalities. Of such details we are certainly not receiving enough.

Our information on contracts and deliveries and credits seems to me to be pretty rich. It fills a fairly hefty bi-weekly publication. Of course, there are obscure corners, but I should seriously question whether the returns to be expected would justify much greater effort than we now expend in this area. I could not myself give high priority to additional collection effort on these questions.

The last item on training programs hits a bell. I believe there is indeed a possibility of usefully increasing our information concerning the selection of students, the treatment of students, and the reactions of students in Bloc training programs.

My suggestion is that the Post-Mortem disassociate the concept of precise information from the generalizations at which we aim, and that it be recast to indicate the specifics, or at least illustrative items, which we think collectors might actually go after.

/S/ Roger Hilsman
Director

INR:AEvans:th:1/31/63